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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD ROBINSON and WIL-
LIAM C. WARD, dba CRYSTAL 
PALA CE MARKET, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY AS-) 
SURANCE CORPORATION, 
LIMITED, a corporation, 
Def end.ant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
11308 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action by an insurance company, suing in 
the name of its insureds, Crystal Palace Market, against 
another insurance company, to recover amounts paid in 
settlement of an action br1ought against Crystal Palace 
by a third party who claimed injuries resulting from a 
defective and dangerous condition of the Crystal Palace 
premises. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After filing their complaint seeking indemnification 
from respondent, appellants moved for summary judg-
ment supported by a copy of a deposition of the third 
party, Robert E. Kodat, taken in the prior action, copies 
of the insurance policie.s involved, a diagram and photo-
graph of appellants' premises, and the affidavit of Ray-
mond M. Berry, attorney for appellants, identifying the 
other documents. Thereafter, respondent filed its motion 
for summary judgment which was supported by the same 
documents, the affidavit of Shirley P. Jones, Jr., attor-
ney for respondent and a copy of the complaint filed 
against appe.p.ants in the prior action. Both motions were 
beard on May 28, 1968, by the Honorable Stewart M. 
Hanson who on May 29, 1968, i,ssued a memorandum 
decision denying appellants' motion for summary judg-
ment and granting that of respondent. Summary judg-
ment was entered on the same date. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent has no actual knowledge as to many of 
the facts stated in appellants' brief, but does not gen-
erally disagree with appellants' statement. However, one 
very important fact has been omitted. Inasmuch as 
2 
respondent's obligations are controlled by the facts 
pleaded in the prior action it is necessary to look at the 
complaint in that action. From an examination of that 
complaint (R-125) it will readily appear that respondent 
had no obligation to defend the action brought by Mr. 
Kodat. Mr. Kodat's action was based upon the grounds 
that appellants' (defendants in that action) premises were 
not safe, in that the stairway leading up to the delivery 
dock was without sufficient handrails or protective de-
vices, that the stairway was ,in need of repair 'Of which 
the owners had knowledge and that the stairway was 
littered with sweepings. In other words, Mr. Kodat's own 
contention was that his injurie,s were caused as a result 
of a dangerous and defective condition of the premises 
of Crystal Palace Market. Nowhere in the complaint 
is there any reference to a truck insured by respon-
dent, nor to any loading or unloading. 
At the time Mr. Kodat allegedly suffered his injury, 
he had not started to take any merchandise· ·out ·Of the 
truck (R-31) and the evidence is unclear as to exactly 
what he was doing when he went up the steps to the dock 
at the Crystal Palace Market. 
Further, there is a provi,sion in respondent's policy 
which, as an addit.iional ground, precludes recovery by 
appellants and which was not cited by appellants in their 
brief. That is, Exclusion ( e) which provides (R-18): 
"This policy does not apply, under Coverage 
A, to any obligation for which the ins~red or adny 
carrier as his insurer may be held liable un er 
3 
any workmen's compensation, unemployment 
compensation or disability benefits law or under 
any ,similar law.'' ' 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THERE WAS NOT AN ACTUAL USE OF THE 
INSURED TRUCK BY APPELLANTS IN LOADING 
OR UNLOADiI:NG OF THE TRUCK OR ANY 
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOADING 
OR UNLOADING AND THE INJURIES TO MR. 
KODAT. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE WAS NO COV-
ERAGE UNDER RESPONDENT'S POLICY. 
Respondent does not argue with appellants' conten-
tions that the words "loading and unloading" are words 
of expansion or that Utah has generally adopted the 
"complete .operations" rule. The Utah case cited by 
appellants, Pacific .Automobile Insura;nce Co. v. Corrtr 
mercial Casualty and Insurance Co., 108 Utah 500, 161 
P.2d 423 (1945) does not by any ,stretch of the imagina-
tion extend coverage under the loading and unloading 
clause to the point that appellants would have it extended 
here. In Pacific the injuries were caused by the driver of 
the insured truck, directly in the ciourse of making a de-
livery from the truck. The injuries were to a third party, 
not to an insured under the automobile policy. There was 
no question of whether the person whose negligence 
caused the injury was an omnibus insured under the 1 
policy. The issue was which of two policies issued to 
4 
the brewing company covered the injuries - the general 
liability policy or the automobile policy. The court merely 
held that the act of raising the trap door was directly 
connected with the loading and unl1oading of the truck 
and that the automobile policy was applicable. As a mat-
ter of fact, the court clearly pointed out that "there must 
be some causal relationship between the use of the in-
sured 's vehicle as a vehicle and the accident for which 
recovery is sought." (Emphasis added), and that the 
intention of the parties tio the insurance contract must be 
kept in mind in determining coverage. Considering these 
two points in the present c&se it is obvious that there is 
no coverage afforded by respondent's policy. Moreover, 
none of the other cases cited by appellants are authority 
for the proposition they urge. As pointed out below, all 
are clearly distinguishable in one manner or another, 
but principally because there was a direct causal relation-
ship between the use of the automobile or truck in those 
cases and the injury complained ·of. There wa•s no such 
causal relationship in this case. Decisions which are more 
clearly in point deny coverage in situations similar to 
the present one. 
A recent case is General Accident Fire & Life In-
surance Corp. v. Brown, 181 N.E. 2d 191 (Ill. App., 
1962). There, Employers Mutual Casualty Company had 
issued an automobile liability policy to Brown Bros. 
Cartage Co. The policy contained a loading and unload-
.ing clause and an omnibus clause almost identical to 
those contained in the policy issued by respondent here. 
Under contract, Brown Bros. delivered merchandise for 
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Libby Furniture Company, who was insured under a 
general liability policy issued by General Accident. 
While one of Brown Bros.' employee·s was carrying two 
lamps from Libby's dock to Brown Bros.' truck he fell 
from the loading <look and injured his leg. He filed suit 
against Libby, claiming that "his injuries were the 
direct result of Libby's defective, hazardous and negli-
gently maintained dock." 
Libby'.s, through General Accident, tendered the 
suit to Employers on the ground that the injury was the 
result of the loading and unloading operation of Brown 
Bros.' vehicle. Employers denied coverage and a decla-
ratory judgment action was brought by General Acci-
dent. The trial court found in favor of Employers and , 
the appellate court affirmed, saying: 
"There must be, as contended by defendant, 
a causal connection between the use of the truck 
and the injury. Although a number of cases simi-
lar to ours did not contain a discussion of this 
essential factor, the ones involving a close ques- , 
tion of causation, point out that the loading and 
unloading clause, being merely an extension of 
the 'use' of the vehicle which is covered by the 
policy, dioes not invoke the coverage of the policy 
unless there is the same degree of causal connec-
tion between the loading or unloading and the ac-
cident as would be required between the actual 
drivino- or use of the vehicle itself and a resulting 
0 
accident. (citing cases). Thus, unless we can d~-
termine that the loading of the truck was the effi-
cient and predominating cause of Blakesley's in-
jury, the matter will not c?me within the term of 
EmpLoyers automobile policy. 
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"On the record before us we cannot say that 
Blakesley',s injury was caused by the loading of 
the truck. In his suit Blakesley alleged that his 
injury was caused solely by Libby's defective 
dock and their negligence in failing to. maintain it. 
Libby owned and controlled the dock and clearly 
had sole responsibility for its maintenance. There 
were no allegations tio the effect that Blakesley's 
carrying of merchandise in any way contributed 
to his fall, nor that any merchandise or anything 
connected with the loading operation or the truck 
itself in any way caused his injury.'' (Emphasis 
added). 
The court, noting its satisfaction that the injury 
was caused by an independent factor or intervening 
cause wholly disassociated with and remote from the use 
of the truck, said that even assuming that injury could 
be said to have beein caused by the loading of the truck, 
the protection of Employers' policy could not be invoked 
because of a clause excluding liability: 
"to any obligation for which the insured or any 
company as his insurer may be held liable, under 
any workman ',s compensation law ... " 
Another pertinent case is Moore-McCormick Lines, 
Inc. v. MarY'land Casualty Co·., 181 F. Supp. 854 (S.D. 
N.Y., 1959). An employee of the plaintiff was injured 
while unloading bags of naptholine onto a truck owned 
by a construction company, which was insured by de-
fendant Maryland Casualty under an automobile in-
surance policy containing loading and unloading and 
omnibus clauses. The employee sued the plaintiff, al-
leging that his injuries were the result of its negligence 
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in permitting the bags of naptholine to remain on the 
deck of the 1ship while being transported, thereby being 
subject to exposure to the elements and for allowing an 
unsafe and dangerous condition to exist. As in the pres-
ent case, there was no allegation of negligence on the 
part of anyone but the plaintiff, Moore-McCormick Lines. 
The plaintiff was insured under a general liability policy 
and its insurer settled the suit with the employee. It 
then brought the action against Maryland Casualty, 
claiming that Moore-McCormick Lines was an omnibus 
insured under the automobile policy issued to the con-
struction company and that the accident arose out of 
the loading and unloading of the truck. The court, noting 
that there was no claim (in the action brought by the 
employee) of any negligence in the loading of the bags 
onto the truck which in any way caused or contributed 
to the accident, said: 
''The case turns on the narrow legal issue of 
whether an insurance carrier can be charged with 
liability under a 'loading and unloading' clause of 
a policy of automobile liability insurance where 
there is no negligence of any kind claimed in con-
nection with the loading or unloading operation." 
The court, pointing out that it was required to rely on 
the law of the State of New York, whose highest decision 
in point was that in Emplovers Mutual Liability lns'l./Jf-
ance Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 181 N.Y.S. 
2d 813 (1958), continued: 
"There it was held that no liability could at-
1 
tach under the clause here in issue, in the absence 
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of a. ·showing that the accident resulted from the 
negligence of defendant's insured in the loading 
or unloading process.'' 
In Clark v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 313 F.2d 160 
(7th Cir., 1960), Sinclair Refining Co. and its insurer 
Zurich Insurance Co. brought suit against Travelers 
Tu:idemnity Co. and its insured Rogers Cartage Co. to 
recover amounts Sinclair and Zurich had been required 
to pay to persons injured as a result of an explosion oc-
curring ·on Sinclair's property. 
A gasoline truck belonging to Rogers had pulled up 
at the 1Sinclair bulk petroleum plant to be loaded. While 
it was being loaded and as the result of faulty equipment 
of Sinclair's, the truck overflowed and gasoline spilled 
on the ground. Shortly thereafter a gasoline truck owned 
by a third party pulled up and Sinclair's employee be-
gan loading that. A gasoline truck owned by Sinclair 
then pulled up behind the other two and immediately 
thereafter the explosion occurred. Persons injured as a 
result of the explosion brought suit against Sinclair, 
which was settled by its insurer Zurich. 
The trial court found that Travelers was required 
to indemnify Zurich by reason of an automobile liability 
policy issued to Rogers which contained the usual load-
ing amd unloading and omnibus clauses. The Court of 
Appeals, in reversing, held that there was an inescapable 
inference that use of Sinclair's truck was the proximate 
contributing cause of the occurrence and that the finding 
of the trial court to the contrary was clearly erroneous. 
It continued: 
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'' ... the explosion was caused by factors for 
~hich S!n~lair h~d the sole responsibility, factors 
wholly disassociated with and remote from' the 
use of Rogers' truck. Consequently, the loading 
of t~e R.oger,s' unit wa,s not the efficient and pre-
dommatmg cause of the explosion.'' 
The court stated that it ·would require a ·strained 
construction to make the language of the policy applic-
able to the i~jury merely because ·of the presence of its 
truck during the loading operation and that while the 
explosion occurred during the loading operation it did 
not ari,se out of such operation. Distinguishing cases 
relied upon by the plaintiffs, it said that there was no 
question in such cases of the negligent maintenance of 
the additional insured 's premises for which responsibil-
ity was sought to be imposed on the automobile insurer, 
nor any issue concerning a causal connection between 
the negligence and the loading operation. 
In discussing the intent of the parties in connection 
with the rate paid by Rogers for the coverage, it said: 
''Under the terms of the policy Rogers, the 
named insured who paid the premiums, is in ef-
fect a ,self-insurer of any liability which it may 
incur up to $10,000. To that extent Rogers wa·s 
without protection. In contrast, Sinclair, an un-
named insured who paid no premiums, claimed 
protection in full for all liability which flow~d 
from its 1own negligence. This liability was dis-
charged by Zurich, its insurer, and as we under-
stand is included in the judgment against Trav-
elers. This means that Sinclair was afforded 
greater protection on a free ride than was Rogers 
who was paying the freight.'' 
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Such language is especially applicable to the facts m 
the present case. 
In R.ogers v. Continental Casualty Company, 155 So. 
2d 641 (Fla., 1963), Continental had issued to a trucking 
company an automobile policy containing the usual om-
nibus and loading and unloading clauses. The trucking 
company was engaged in hauling barges which were 
being lifted onto its trucks by a crane company. An em-
ployee of the crane company had loaded one truck and 
was swinging out to get another barge when the crane 
came in contact with a high tension power line. As a 
result, the employee riding the crane and another were 
injured. Suit was brought against the crane company 
and the operator. The question was whether Continental 
had a duty to defend the operator or pay any liability 
imposed upon him as a result of the accident. It was 
argued that he was loading the truck!s and thus was an 
additional insured under Continental 's policy. In hold-
ing that Continental had no obligation to defend, the 
court .said that the many cases cited by the plaintiff 
were not in point, because there was no question of 
causal connection between the accident and the loading 
and unloading of the vehicle in those cases. It held that 
a causal connection was required, and stated: 
''An accident is causally connected with the 
process ·of loading or unloading within the mean-
ing of the clause, if the loading or unloading was 
its efficient and predominating cause." 
Holding that it was not necessary to decide whether 
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the ''coming to rest'' doctrine or the ''complete opera-
tions'' doctrine applied, the court continued: 
''.But where, a~ here, the injury is caused by 
a third party who is not connected with the truck 
and who has no legal relationship to the named 
insured and who under normal circumstances 
would not be using the truck of the named in-
sure~,. it must first ~ppear before the liability 
prov1s1ons of the policy beoome applicable that 
such third party was in the actual use of the truck 
at the time of the injury, with the express or im-
plied permission of the named insured.'' 
It should be noted that the policy issued by respond-
ent in the present case requires that the omnibus insured 
be in "actual use" of the automobile. 
Hartford Accident and Indenunity Company v. Fire-
man's Fund Indemnity Company, 298 F.2d 423 (7th Cir., 
1962) was a case in which Hartford had insured a rural 
gas service company Ufilder an automobile policy con-
taining a loading and unloading clause. Fireman's Fund, 
insured the company under a general liability policy ex-
cluding coverage with respect to the loading or unload-
ing of vehicles. A delivery man of the company, de-
livering a tank of propane gas to a customer, went to 
the wrong house where he turned on a propane tank and 
found that it was not empty. The occupant of the house 
advised him that they had not ordered the gas and he 
then delivered the gas to the proper customer. He failed 
to turn the tank, which had been disconnected from any 
appliance, back off. Thereafter there was an explo·sion 
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in the house, resulting from the gas tank being turned on. 
Hartford paid the damages after Fireman's Fund's 
refusal to do so and then brought suit to recover the 
amount from Fireman's Fund. The court found in favor 
of Hartford, saying: 
"Olsen's turning the valve had nothing to do 
with unloading the truck. His assigned use of the 
truck was to deliver a tank of propane gas to 
Elmer Dickens who lived in another house. His 
negligent act was not a part of the delivery of 
the tank to Dickens. It had no relation to or con-
nection with unloading or delivery. Neither the 
tank nor the truck, including its equipment, was 
used by Olsen in the commi.ssion of his negligent 
act. In mistakenly turning on the valve, Olsen did 
something independent of and entirely removed 
from his use of the truck for the business purpose 
of his trip ... 
"The mere fact that the negligent act oc-
curred before the unioad.ing or delivery wa1s com-
pleted is of no consequence where such negligence 
has no relation to it and did not arise out of the 
use of the motor vehicle as defined within the 
limits of Hartford's policy provisiions." (Em-
phasis added). 
The court then said that even though its jurisdiction 
followed the ''complete operations'' rule, the explosion 
and occurrences leading up to it did not come within the 
loading and unloading provision of Hartford's automo-
bile policy and Fireman's Fund was liable under its 
general liability policy. 
A New York ca·se which points out the inapplicability 
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of the Wagman case, cited by appellants, is Eastern 
Chemicals, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Company, 199 
N.Y.S.2d 48 (1960). There, a trucking company was en-
gaged to haul products for Eastern Chemicals. While it 
was engaged in such hauling, but when there was no 
activity in the unloading process, one of the containers 
on the truck exploded, and the truck driver was injured. 
Continental insured the trucking company under a policy 
oontaining the usual loading and unloading and omnibus 
clauses. The truck driver sued Eastern Chemicals and it 
and its insurer brought suit to compel Continental to 
defend the action, upon the basis that plaintiff was an 
additional insured under the policy. (It will be noted 
that the relationship of the parties was identical to that 
in the present case.) The court in holding that Contin-
Pntal had no liability said: 
"Since the adoption in this state of the 'com-
plete operation' doctrine in the matter of loading 
and unloading by the Court of Appeals in Wag-
man v. American Fidelity & Casualty Go., there 
can be no doubt that Eastern would be an addi-
tional insured of Continental if the accident in 
which Mitchell was injured was caused by some 
negligent act in the loading or unloading. 
''In the Wagman case as well as in those 
which have followed it to the same conclusion, 
there was no question about negligence causing 
the damage during the loading or unloading pro-
cess. In that case the claim of the injured per·s~n 
was for nealigence on the part of one engaged m 
the cnmplete operation of loading or unloading .. · 
" ... we are presented with a different prob· 
14 
le~. He.re the injured person, Mitchell, by his own 
aff1~av1t, expressly disclaims any negligence in 
loadmg or unloading either in the former narrow 
sense or in the now 'complete operation' sense. 
If he makes no such claim, there is no coverage 
for the. named insured, Dubrey, or for any un-
named msured ... Even standing by itself and 
with all the liberality to be given to the con~truc­
tion of a pleading, it would take a very strained 
construction to so hold in the light of the negli-
gence charged against Eastern by way of 'allow-
ing the shipment of an inherently dangerous priod-
uct without adequate safeguards ... Here, the 
injured person expressly said that his injuries 
occurred through causes wholly unrelated to 'load-
ing and unloading' in any sense. On the basis of 
such claim by the injured person, there is no cov-
erage for either the named or unnamed assured.'' 
In Travelers Insurance Company v. Buckeye Union 
Casualty Co., 172 Ohio S.T. 507, 178 N.E.2d 792 (1961), 
the defendant had issued an automobile policy containing 
the general loading and unloading and omnibus clauses 
to an owner of a tank truck. At the time of the accident, 
the insured vehicle wa,s on the premises of a bulk diesel 
fuel station, an employee of which moved a pipe toward 
the truck in order to fill it. A quantity of diesel fuel 
rushed out of the pipe and knocked the truck driver off 
the truck onto the ground. The plaintiff, who was insurer 
under a policy of premises liability insurance covering 
the fuel station, claimed that the automobile policy cov-
ered the liability of the owner of the fuel station and that 
its policy was merely excess insurance. 
The court held that the fuel station employee was 
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not using the truck for any purpose at the time of the 
accident so as to have liability for his negligence come 
within the coverage of the policy of insurance covering 
the truck and said: 
"Although 'using' and 'actual use' dio· not 
have the limited meaning of 'operating' or 'ac-
tual operation' ... neither can ,such words be 
extended beyond what may reasonably be implied 
from the circumstances of the caise or the rela-
tionship of the parties. -Where third parties are 
involved, it cannot be validly claimed that mutual 
acquiescence constitutes permissive use until 
some particular use of the truck appears which 
may be the subject of acquiescence.'' 
The court noting that there was no movement by 
any·one of anything which had any relationship to the 
purposeful presen<~e of the truck continued: 
''To accord to this policy the construction 
which Travelers claims was intended leads to the 
conclusion that McCracken paid premiums to 
Buckeye so that Buckeye would insure and pro-
tect Gulf against the claims of McCracken. It 
seems doubtful that the parties to the oontract 
so intended. In our opinion, Gulf '·s employee was 
not using McCracken's truck for any purpose. 
He was not therefore an 'insured' under the 
policy issued by Buckeye.'' 
This case was followed by the Ohio court in Buck-
eye Union Casualty Co. v. Illinois National Insurarnce 
Co., 206 N.E.2d 209 (1965), where a store employee 
.slammed a trunk lid on a customer'•s head while loading 
"'roceries in an automobile. The court held that there was 
b 
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not an actual use of the automobile by the named insured 
or with his permission and further said that the clause 
cannot be used to extend coverage for injurie,s to an 
insured: 
''The action to be def ended by Illinois must 
be against an insured of Illinois. Under this hold-
ing, we cam never arrive at a finding that the 
insured may be a claimant against a company 
which has computed the risk to protect the insured 
only against the claims of others.'' 
In Zurich General Accident Insurance Co. v. Amer-
ican Mutual Life Insurance Co., 192 Atl. 387 (N.J., 1937), 
the insurer was held not liable for damages resulting 
when the insured's driver delivered a can of milk and 
some ice to a customer's place of business. After he had 
unloaded them from the truck and was about to place 
them in the customer's ice box, the customer was injured 
by an ice pick in the driver's pocket. The court therein 
stated: 
"The contracting parties plainly contemplated 
an accident immediately identified with the own-
ership, maintenance, use or operation of the 
vehicle and the mishap which befell (the cus-
tomer) does not fall into that category. The 
words (of the loading and unloading clause) re-
late to the vehicle itself, and exclude accidents 
which are only remotely connected with its own-
ership, maintenance, use or operation. A con-
struction that would include within a coverage 
clause so phrased, the thing being done when t?i.s 
accident happened would impart to it an artifi-
cial meaning at variance with the apparent in-
tention of the parties." 
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In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Employe·rs Casualty 
Co., 370 S.W.2d 105 (Texas Civ. App., 1963), three per. 
sons were killed by the collapse of a crane loading onto 
trucks insured by the defendant. The general liability 
insurer of the crane company tried to recover from the 
insurer of the trucks under the loading and unloading 
clause. The court in denying recovery said: 
"We think also that coverage under the 'load-
ing and unloading' provisions includes a require-
ment of showing ·some causal connection between 
the loading or unloading and the accident ... In 
this case, so far as the record ,shows it was a 
defect in Borders crane which caused the acci-
dent, not anything done in the unloading of Capi-
tol '·s truck. The connection between the accident 
and unloading of the truck seems too remote tio 
include coverage of the accident under Capitol's 
policy." 
Other cases which require a direct causal connec-
tion between the actual loading and unloading of the 
truck and the accident are Travelers Insurance Co. v . 
.American Hardware Mutual, Insurance Co., 209 N.E.2d 
344 (Mass., 1965); Morgan v. New York Casualty Co., 
188 S.E. 581 (Ga., 1936); Kaufmann v. Liberty Insurance 
Co., 264 F.2d 863 (3rd Cir., 1959); Bituminous Casualty 
Corp. v. Hartford .Accident and Indemnity Co., 330 F.2d 
96 (7th Cir., 1964); Ferry v. Protective Indemnity Co·., 
:~8 A.2d 493 (Pa., 1944). 
The foregoing cases clearly establish (1) that there 
must be a causal relationship between the loading and 
unloading of the automobile and the injury complained 
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of or, specifically, that the use of the automobile must 
be the efficient and predominating cause of the accident· 
' (2) that considering the intent of the parties such pro-
visions cannot be construed to extend coverage for in-
juries to an insured resulting from the negligence of a 
third party, as the insurance company has computed a 
ri,sk to protect the insured only against the claims of 
others; (3) that in the action for which indemnity is 
sought, there must be some allegation regarding the 
use of the insured automobile, and, in fact, an actual 
use thereof. 
An additional case basing lack of coverage upon the 
last point is Morga;n v. New York Casualty Co., 188 S.E. 
581 (Ga., 1936). Employees of the plaintiff, who was 
covered by an automobile policy with a loading and un-
loading clause, were unloading coal dO"\\'ll a chute. They 
left the chute open and a pedestrian fell through it. The 
pedestrian brought suit against the plaintiff alleging 
that he was negligent in leaving the coal chute open and 
unattended and not placing a rail around the same or a 
red light or other warning to warn pedestrians of the 
danger. The court holding that the automobile insurer 
was not responsible said that there was no claimed in-
juries resulting from negligent operation from the use 
of the truck in any way: 
"Of oour,se, irnsofar as the allegations of the 
(pedestrian',s) petition show, the coal may have 
been hauled to the ooal chute in a wagon or rolled 
there in a wheelbarrow. In other words, there is 
nothing in that ,suit that in any way connects the 
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use of the automobile truck covered in the insur-
ance contract with the open coal chute ... So it 
clearly appears in the allegations of the Freeman 
petition that the p:rioximate cause of his injury 
was not from the use ·or operation ·of the truck 
transporting of materials or merchandise and 
loading or unloading but the pro:JGimate cause of 
hi.s injuries was his falling i1nto an open and un-
tended ooal chute.'' 
A·s stated earlier, and as will be ·shown below, all of 
the cases cited by appellants are distinguishable. In 
Bobier v. National Casualty Co., 143 Ohio 215, 54 N.E.2d 
798 (1944), ·one of the cases cited by appellants, the in-
juries resulted to a third party from acts involved in the 
loading or unloading. There was no question of causation 
or of the other factors mentioned above. More recent 
decisions from the State of Ohio support defendant's 
position in this case. 
In Wagma;n v. A_.merican Fidelity & Casualty, 304 
N.Y. 490, 109 N.E.2d 592 (1952), the injurie.s again were 
caused to a third party by an employee of the store. The 
case was decided upon the basis that the store's liability 
was vicarious, thus it could recover from its negligent 
employee any amounts it had been required to pay be-
cause of its vicarious liability. The employee was an 
~dditio~al insured and the store had a cause of action 
against both its employee and his insurer. 
In that case the employer had been sued by the in-
jured third ·party and then cross-claimed against its 
employee Wagman. Not only was there no question of 
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causation, but the injuries were caused by the negligence 
·of the ·employee not the store. 
Industrial Indemnity Co. v. General Insurance Co. 
of America, 26 Gal. Rep. 2d 568 (1962) was also a case of 
vicarious liability on the part of an employer whose 
employe~·s were not covered by his general liability 
policy. Hence, the court held that the defendant's auto-
mobile policy was primary. The same elements that dis-
tinguish the prior c&ses distinguish this one. The court 
further pointed out that if the employees had been cov-
ered by the plaintiff's policy that insurance would be 
primary, not the automobile insurance policy. 
Travelers Insurance Company v. W. F. Saunders 
Sons, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 126, 238 N.Y.S.2d 495 (1933) 
is further distinguishable on the .same basis as the pre-
ceding cases. It involved the question of one vicariously 
liable recovering from his employee who was deemed to 
be an omnibus insured under the loading and unloading 
provision. There was the lack of a question of causal 
relationship. New York decisions which are more closely 
in point to the present case reach a different result. 
In Drew Chemical Corp. v. American Fore & Loy-
alty, 218 A.2d 875 (N.J., 1966) there again wais the ques-
tion of vicarious liability on the part of the insured em-
ployer but the question of causal relationship was spe-
cifically discussed. Such causal relationship was held to 
bave existed, the court saying that ''all that is required 
to establish coverage is that the act or omission which 
resulted in the injury was necessary to carry out the 
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loading and unloading.'' (Emphasis added). The act or 
omission in that case was clearly part of the unloading 
process because they \Vere clearing a hose which was 
connected to the truck and used to unload the acid into 
a tank. 
In the present case it cannot be said that the act or 
omission which resulted in the injury was in any way 
related to the loading or unloading. The act or omission 
which caused the injury according to the injured party 
himself was the negligent maintenance of unsafe condi-
tion of plaintiff's ·stairs and loading dock. It certainly 
was not necessary to the unloading of any of plaintiff's 
merchandise that they maintain an unsafe and dangerous 
condition on their premises. 
In Flo-at-Away Door Co. v. Continental Casualty 
Company, 372 F.2d 701 (5th Cir., 1967) there was no 
question of causation. The injuries resulted to an em-
ployee of a third party as a direct result of the negligent 
loading of the truck. The principal issue was whether 
there could be any liability when the injury occurred 
after the omnibus insured bad completed the loading 
operation. The court held that since the omnibus insured 
was covered as an insured while using the vehicle, the 
extent of coverage should be measured by the clause 
obligating the insurer to pay damages "arising out of 
the ownership, maintenance or use of any automobile,'' 
and said "clearly the accident 'arose out of' the negli-
gent loading of the trailer by Float-Away, at which time 
it was an additional insured under the policy." The 
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court on petition for rehearing clearly distinguished be-
tween a situation where the injured person was an em-
ployee of the named insured and where he was employed 
by a third party. The injured pernon in Float-Away 
plainly contended in his action against the omnibus in-
sured that his injuries arose out of the negligent loading 
of the vehicle; not because of an unsafe condition of its 
premises. The requirement that the loading and unload-
ing of the automobile must be the efficient and pre-
dominating cause of the accident, was met. 
The court in McCloskey & Co. v. Allstate Insurance 
Co\, 358 F.2d 544 (D.C. Cir., 1966) did discuss the ques-
tion of causation. The court, merely applying the coni-
plete operations rule, indicated that the unloading had 
begun at the time of the accident, said both parties had 
litigated the case on the implicit premise that negligence 
in the handling operation of the crane had caused the 
accident and that, assuming thi·s to be so, the preparatory 
acts involved in unloading were an efficient and pre-
dominating cause of the accident. The case was remand-
ed, however, so that the insurer could present any de-
fenses it might have to negative any conclusion that the 
injury arose out of the unloading process. 
In many of the caises cited by appellants, the in-
jured party had claimed that his injurie1s arose out of 
what was eventually determined to be the loading or un-
loading process. That is not the situation in the present 
case where the injured employee claimed and the facts 
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establish that the injuries arose out of conditions in no 
way connected with the loading or unloading process. 
Thompson Heating Corp. v. Hardware Inde-mnity it 
Insurance Co., 74 Ohio App. 350, 58 N.E.2d 809 (1944) 
was a case somewhat similar to Pacific .Auto, the Utah 
caise, in that the plaintiff was the named insured under 
two policies-one a general liability and the other an 
automobile liability. The question was which of the two 
afforded coverage. The court pointed out that the truck 
from which the hose was extending was specifically 
manufactured for blowing rock wool. Hence, the accident 
arose during the unloading process. The case affords 
respondent considerably more comfort than it does ap-
pellants as pointed out under Point III below. 
In Hertz Corp. v. Bellin, 288 A.D.2d 1101, 284 
N.Y.S.2d 140 (1967) the facts were not stated in the report 
of the caise. It isn't even possible to tell who was injured. 
The most it indicates is that when an injury results from 
an employee pushing an empty dolly after unloading a 
truck it is part of the unloading process. 
The only case cited by appellants which is difficult 
to di,stinguish is that of Continental Casualty Company 
v. Duffy, 26 A.D.2d 60, 272 N.Y.S.2d 470 (1966). How-
ever, its persuasivene,ss is somewhat diminished when the 
same court in the same volume of the reports concludes, 
under a fact situation remarkably close to the present 
case, that there was no causal connection and hence no 
coverage. In Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal v. Phoenix 
of Hartford Ins. Co., 26 A.D.2d 267, 272 N.Y.S.2d 443 
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(1966) the injured party in the prior personal injury suit 
had been injured when he slipped from a platform while 
loaiding a truck at the plaintiff '.s warehouse. He alleged 
in his complaint against the plaintiff that the accident 
was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff in permit-
ting grease to accumulate on the loading platform of the 
warehouse premises which rendered the platform s~ip­
pery and dangerous. The court pointed out that there was 
no allegation of negligence in the actual loading or un-
loading of the truck. While it was true that the accident 
occurred during the loading process, it was not the re-
sult of any act or omission incident thereto. The accident, 
it said, could have happened to any one who walked on 
the platform (as it could have in the present case.) It 
thus did not arise out of the complete operation of mov-
ing goods to or from the truck. Summary judgment in 
favor of the defendant insurer was affirmed. 
Appellants, in their brief, appear to admit that 
there was no causal relationship between the use of the 
truck and the injuries to Mr. Kodat, but say that 
"nothing in the automobile liability policy requires the 
accident be proximately caused by use of the truck." Of 
course, automobile policies generally do not specifically 
provide that the injury must be "proximately caused" 
but the question of proximate cause is always present . 
.As stated in the General Accident case, supra., there 
must be the same degree of causal connection between 
the loading or unloading and the accident as would be 
required between the actual driving of the vehicle itself 
and the resulting accident. Here, there was no oonnec-
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tion. Mr. Kodat's injuries resulted, he alleged, from the 
defective and dangerous condition of the appellants' 
premises. There is no support in the record for appel-
lants' statement that if Mr. Kodat had not been carry-
ing the bills of lading in his left hand he would not have 
slipped. If that was the case, then the injuries were 
caused by Mr. Kodat's own negligence, and there was 
no liability. 
All that appellants are really doing in this case is 
restating the complete operations doctrine, and that is 
all the cases cited by them stand for. Respondent doe·s 
not quarrel with that doctrine but contend that the acci-
dent must not only have occurred during the loading or 
unloading process but mnst have been caused by it. In 
some of the cases cited above the accidents were much 
more closely connected with an actual loading or un-
loading of the vehicle than in the present case, but since 
the loading or unloading was not the efficient and pre-
dominating cause of the accident there was no coverage. 
II 
RESPONDENT HAD NO DUTY TO DEFEND 
APPELLANTS AGAINST THE SUIT BROUGHT BY 
THE INJURED THIRD PARTY FOR THE REASON 
'rHAT THE COMPLAINT-A-CLEARLY EXCLUDED 
COVERAGE UNDER RESPONDENT'S POLICY. 
Innumerable cases establish that a liability insurer 
has no duty to def end an insured unless the complaint 
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or petition in the suit alleges facts which, at the very 
least, may bring the case under coverage of the policy. 
The cases to that effect are so numerous that it would 
serve no purpose to cite, but a few of the more recent 
ones. One such case is Paulin v. Fireman's Fwnd Insur-
ance Co., 403 P.2d 555 (Ariz., 1965). The plaintiff while 
driving in his car stopped and grabbed a lady private 
detective who had been following him and forceably held 
her in the car until the police arrived. She thereafter 
brought suit for assault and battery and false imprison-
ment, the defense of which was tendered to defendant. 
Defendant declined defense on the grounds that the 
policy did not provide coverage for injuries intentionally 
caused by the insured. Appellant contended that the in-
surance company could not refuse to defend against a 
suit by a third party on the grounds that the allegations 
of the complaint excluded coverage when the facts known, 
are reasonably ascertainable by it, indicated that the 
claim was covered. The court rejected this contention 
and held for the insurer, stating: 
"The great weight of authority in the United 
States seems to be that the obligation of the lia-
bility insurance company under policy provisions 
substantially the same as now before us is to be 
determined by the allegations of the complaint to 
be def ended (citing cases).'' 
In Town of Tieton v. General Insurance Company of 
America, 380 P.2d 127 (Wash., 1963) the plaintiff town 
had been sued by an individual who claimed that hi,s well 
had been contaminated when the town constructed· a 
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sewage lagoon. The complaint alleged three causes of 
of action: ( 1) negligence in the construction of the 
sewage lagoon; (2) an unconstitutional damaging; and 
(3) nuisance. The insurance company which had issued 
a liability policy to the tovvn covering damages "caused 
by accident'' refused to defend the town on the last two 
counts. The Washington court in holding for the insurer's 
stated: 
"The duty to defend under such provision is 
determined by the allegations of the complaint ... 
"vVhile an accident may occur without negli-
gence, a complaint, alleging an unconstitutional 
taking or damaging, or nuisance, by itself, does 
not allege an accident ... Since the allegations 
accompanying these theories do not allege facts 
oonstituting an accident, appellant was justified 
in refusing to defend respondent at the second 
trial.'' 
Another pertinent case is Crist v. Potomac Insur-
ance Company, 413 P.2d 407 (Ore., 1966). The defendant 
had issued a property damage policy to plaintiff which 
contained an exclusion as to "property controlled by 
the named insured, property in the care, custody or con-
trol of insured or property as to which the insured for 
any purpose is exercising physical control.'' 
One Roberts had contracted to move logs for plain-
tiff by means of a shovel loader belonging to Roberts. 
One of plaintiff's employees without authorization and 
in the absence of Roberts' operator attempted to operate 
the loader, tipping it over and damaging it. Roberts 
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sued plaintiffs and the case was settled by the payment 
of $2,500 by plaintiffs. The insurance company refused 
to def end the action upon the ground that the complaint 
by Roberts excluded coverage. The court upheld the re-
fusal to def end saying: 
''This court adheres to the rule that the obli-
gation of the insurer to defend is to be determined 
by the allegations of the complaint filed against 
the insured.'' 
Inasmuch as the complaint showed that the employee 
was operating the loader, and hence was in phy.sical 
control of it, the exclusionary clause applied and there 
was no coverage. The court concluded: 
"Hence, we hold that the complaint in the 
Roberts case failed to state a claim against the 
present plaiintiffs covered by the policy, and the 
defendant insurance company was, therefore, 
under no obligation to defend the action." 
Appellants cite .several California cases holding 
that in some instances the insurer is bound to defend if 
the facts known to it indicate there is coverage regard-
less of the allegations of the complaint. This is definitely 
only a minority rule and even in jurisdictions where fol-
lowed, the complaint must present, at the very leaet, the 
possibility that damages covered by the policy might be 
obtained. In Gray v. Zurich Insurarnce Co., 419 P.2d 168 
(Cal., 1966) the complaint was for bodily injury which 
was clearly covered by the policy except for an exclusion-
ary clause relating to intentional injuries. Deciding that 
there was a duty to defend the court noted that "since 
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the policy sets forth the duty to defend as a primary one 
and since the insurer attempts to avoid it only by an 
unclear exclusionary clause, the insurer would reason-
ably expect, and is legally entitled to such protection." 
That the reasoning of Gray would not be extended to 
cover the facts of the present case is evidenced by an apt 
discussion therein: 
"The insured counters with the contention 
that this position would compel &n insurer 'issu-
ing a policy covering liability of the insured for 
maintenance, use or operation of an automobile 
... to def end the insured in an action for dam-
ages for negligently mainta~ning a stairway and 
thereby allegedly causing injury to another -
because the insured claims that the ,suit for dam-
ages was false or groundle,ss '. The 'groundless, 
false or fradulent' clause, however, does not ex-
tend the obligation to defend without limits; it 
includes only defense to those actions of the na-
ture and kind covered by the policy." 
Theodore v. Zurich General Accident Liability In-
surance Co., 364 P.2d 51 (Alaska, 1961), cited by appel-
lants, specifically states that the obligation of the insurer 
to defend is controlled by the allegations made in the 
complaint. There the complaint was sufficient, hut the 
insurer felt that the allegations did not state the true 
facts. The question of reasonableness of the settlement 
was not discussed. The court merely held that the insurer 
after ,breaching its duty to defend did not have the right 
to later show that there was no coverage. Respondent 




ASSUMING THAT THERE IS COVERAGE 
UNDER RESPONDENT'S POLICY, APPELLANTS 
H.A'.VE THE BURDEN OF SHOWING THAT THE 
SETTLEMENT WAS A REASONABLE ONE AND 
IN GOOD FAITH, AND THIS BURDEN INVOLVES 
THE DETERMINATION OF A DISPUTED QUES-
TION OF FACT. 
Appellants' statement that once a duty to defend 
is breached, the insurer becomes liable to indemnify the 
insured for the entire loss resulting from the breach is 
not supported by the cases-not even those cited by 
appellants. In Thompson Heating Corporation v. Hard-
ware Indemnity & Insurance Company, supra, for ex-
ample, the trial court found that there was no duty to 
defend and granted summary judgment for the insurer. 
On reversal, the supreme court noted that if there had 
been a ,sufficient finding that the settlement made by 
the insured had been a reasonable one and made in good 
faith, it would enter judgment for the plaintiffs. Since 
there wa;s not a sufficient finding of reasonableness the 
court remanded, noting that the burden of proof was on 
the plaintiff to show that the settlement was reasonable. 
In Richie v. Anchor Casiialty Co., 286 P.2d 1000 
(Cal., 1955) the court stated that the refusal to defend 
gave the plaintiffs "the right to make any reasonable 
and bona fide compromise of the adion against them.'' 
(Emphasis added.) 
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To the same effect was Theodore v. Zurich Gene-
eral Accident and Liability Insurance Company, supra, 
and Arenson v. National Auto &': Casualty Insurance 
Company, 310 P.2d 961 (Cal., 1957). 
Other cases cited by appellants do not hold otherwise, 
In the Lowe and Gray cases, for example, there had not 
been a settlement but a judgment entered against the 
insured, 1so the question of reasonableness was not 
raised. Missionaries of the Company of Mary, Inc., v. 
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 230 A.2d 21 (Conn., 1967), 
like the Theodore case, did not deal with the question of 
reasonableness but whether the insurer after breaching 
its duty to defend could then attempt to show that there 
was no coverage. Nor \ms the question of rea,sonablenes~ 
discussed in Kong Yick Investment Co. v. Maryland 
Casualty Co., 423 P.2d 935 (Wash., 1967). There the 
only question was whether the complaint ,stated facts 
which came within coverage of the policy. 
In the present case, it would appear from Mr. Kodat 's 
own deposition (R. 31 lines 9-11; R. 33 lines 15-22; R. 
35 lines 6-29; R. 49 lines 15-30; R. 50 lines 1-13) that the 
injuries to Mr. Kodat were, at the very least, contributed 
to by his own negligence. Thus, a settlement of $15,000 
was not reasonable and (assuming coverage) respondent 
should not be liable to indemnify appellants' insurer, 
simply because appellants' insurer elected to pay a 
wholly unjustified claim in the hope of forcing some kind 
of a contribution from respondent. 
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IV 
COVERAGE IS EXCLUDED BY A PROVISION 
IN THE POLICY MAKING THE POLICY INAP-
PLICABLE TO ANY LOSSES COVERED BY WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION LAW. 
Exclusion '' e" of respondent ',s policy provides: 
"This policy does not apply, under coverage 
'A' to any obligation for which the insured or any 
carrier as his insurer may be held liable under 
any workmen's compensation law ... " 
In the present case the injury to Mr. Kodat was an 
obligation for which the named insured, Associated 
Foods, Inc., was liable under the Utah Workmen's Com-
pensation Law. In fact, the State Insurance Fund paid 
to Mr. Kodat the sum of $10,269.64, more than two-thirds 
the amount of the settlement. From the settlement made 
with Mr. Kodat, the State Insurance Fund having ac-
tually joined with Mr. Kodat in instituting the suit 
against appellants, recovered the amount it had paid 
(R. 59). If appellants should be entitled to recover from 
respondents in this action, the State Insurance Fund 
would, in effect, be recovering amounts it paid out to 
Mr. Kodat under an obligation to do so by contract with 
Associated Foods, Inc. Such result is excluded by the 
policy and also by the Workmen's Compensation Act. 
Section 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated, (1953) provide.s: 
"The right to recover compensation pursuant 
to provisions of this title fior injurie~ sustained 
by an employee ... shall be the exclusive remedy 
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against the employer and shall be the exclusive 
remedy against any officer, agent or employee of 
the employer and the liabilities of the employer 
imposed by this act shall be in place of any a:nd 
all other civil liability whatsoever at common law 
or otherwise to such employee .... '' 
While this action is not directly against the em-
ployer, the result is the same inasmuch as it pays the 
premiums both to the State Insurance Fund and to re-
spondent. These premiums are affected by the number of 
claims made under the policies. 
The only exception to Section 35-1-60 is Section 35-
1-62 Utah Code Annotated 1953, which allows the em-
ployee to bring an action against a third party who,se 
wrongful act has caused the injuries complained of. 
Here, however, the action is not against the negligent 
third party but by it. 
Whether or not the above provision of the policy and 
the ·workmen's Compensation Law prevent plaintiff 
from recovering all the amounts paid to Mr. Kodat, they 
would at least be precluded from recovering the amount 
for which the State Insurance Fund was the real party 
in interest. 
v 
EVEN ASSUMING LIABILITY, APPELLANTS' 
POLICY PROVIDED PRIMARY COVERAGE. 
The Utah cases cited by appellants, Russell v. Poul-
son, 118 Utah 2d 157, 417 P .2d 658 ( 1966), deals with the 
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situation, as does several of this court's prior decisions, 
where both policies were for automobile liability. They 
covered the same type of risk. The reasoning in those 
cases should not apply to a situation where there is one 
policy specifically intended for and covering a certain 
type of risk and another policy which may happen to 
include the loss within its scope. There have been a num-
ber of tests to determine primary and excess insurance. 
One often advanced by the courts is that where there is 
a specific and a general policy the specific policy is 
primary. See Couch on Insurance 2d., Section 62 :59. 
The claim against appellants in this case clearly 
arose out of an alleged defect in their premise,s for which 
they would be covered under United Pacific's policy. It 
would be the more specific policy. 
Another factor, which frequently determines wheth-
er coverage is excess or primary or indeed whether there 
is coverage at all is the intent of the parties to the insur-
ance contract. As stated in a number of the cases cited 
herein, it is doubtful that the parties to respondent's 
policy had intended that a third party who had no con-
nection with the contract would be covered under the 
policy for injuries resulting from its own negligence and 
not even of the type for which the insurance was written. 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellants were sued for an injury resulting al-
legedly from their own negligence in maintaining unsafe 
and defective premises. Their insurer, who is the real 
party in interest in this case, and who issued a policy to 
appellants specifically covering such situations, now 
attempts to place liability upon the insurer of the in-
jured person and his employer who wrote a policy to 
cover liabilities for injuries arising out of the use of an 
automobile. The injured party in his action against ap-
pellants made no claim whatsoever that his injury arose 
out of the use of an automobile or that loading or un-
loading caused the injuries. In fact it did not. Apart 
from the question of intention there are various other 
reasons why as a matter of law summary judgment was 
properly granted to respondents: 
1. Appellants were not using the automobile insured 
by respondent in any sense of the word and more spe-
cifically, there wa,s no actual use of the vehicle by them 
as the policy requires in the case of unnamed insureds. 
2. Even if appellants could be said to have been using 
the automobile insured by respondent, there was no 
causal relationship between the use of such automobile 
and the injury complained of. The injury was caused by 
factors for which appellants had sole responsibility, and 
factors which were wholly <lisassof·iated with and remote 
from the use of an automobile. Such use was not the 
efficient and predominant cause of the injury. 
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3. Respondent had no obligation to defend appellants 
or provide coverage to them, because there was no alle-
gation in the action brought by the injured party that in 
any way connected the automobile insured by d!Olfendants 
with the injury, nor any evidence that respondent knew 
of facts which would connect it. The injured party him-
self said that the injury arose out of negligent mainten-
ance and unsafe condition of appellants' loading dock. 
4. Appellants motion for summary judgment cannot 
be granted because the reasonableness and good faith of 
appellants settlement is disputed by respondent. 
5. The injury was covered by workmen's compensa-
tion and coverage is excluded by the expres.s terms of 
respondent's policy, as it was an obligation for which the 
insured or its insurer could be held liable under the 
Workmen'.s Compensation Law. 
6. The policy written by the real party in interest in 
this ca·se specifically covers the injury so in any event its 
insurance would he primary. 
7. The clauses involved cannot be used to extend 
coverage to an insured. 
None of the cases cited by respondent, except per-
haps one, would extend coverage under the loading and 
unloading and omnibus clauses to the extent it is advo-
cated by appellants here, whereas cases involving like 
situations specifically exclude coverage. For the fore-
going reasons, the summary judgment granted to re-
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spondent should be affirmed. In the event it is not 
affirmed, factual questions, particularly those relating 
to the reasonableness of the settlement, would preclude 
summary judgment for appellants. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIRLEY P. JONES, JR. 
RALPH L. JERMAN 
510 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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